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ABSTRACT
ELEANOR WELLER: The Data Revolution
(Under the direction of Paul Johnson)
The area of study for this thesis is the use and optimization of the sub-departments
within the larger baseball operations department in Major League Baseball front offices.
The research is divided into the history of the two major units—scouting and analytics.
This background is followed by an investigation of the balance between them.
Information for this analysis was obtained through secondary research, primarily articles
for online journals and previously conducted interviews with front office personnel. I
have also included some of my own work, which was completed during the summer of
2019. The findings of the analysis are that the balance between scouting and analytics in
the game today is going to vary for each team depending on the resources of the
organization as well as the competencies of the general manager. Three teams—the
Houston Astros, St. Louis Cardinals, and San Diego Padres—are used to exemplify the
variation. Overall, there is not a single correct way to operate the department, but rather a
proper method to determine the balance that is optimal for the individual team.
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INTRODUCTION
The game of baseball is as inherent to the culture of the United States as fireworks
on the Fourth of July. On the outside, America’s Greatest Pastime is about ballpark
hotdogs, fan favorite players, and walk-off celebrations in the bottom of the ninth inning:
the typical fan does not concern themselves with the 40th round of the amateur draft,
arbitration contracts, or launch angle. However, so much more happens within a billiondollar baseball team than can be seen from the bleacher seats on an August day.
Owners and executives concern themselves heavily over the acquisition of players
via the draft, trades, or free agent signings. At the end of the day, baseball clubs are
businesses, and to make money there has to be a team out on the field. Acquisitions were
much simpler in the early days of baseball. As time progressed and competition
increased, a greater focus has been placed on how to build a team. It is not only important
to be at a position to compete in the following year, but also to sustain that position over
the following five to ten years, since the highest profits come from teams competing in
the playoffs. The need for a sustained competitive advantage has increased the
importance of the amateur draft, placed an emphasis on player development, and led to
rebuilds—teams purposefully trading short-term success for long-term.
All Major League Baseball front offices understand the necessity of player
acquisitions. The unknown is the how. With new technologies and processes being
discovered every year, teams have to decide which viewpoints they wish to subscribe to.
Continuing with the original methods has its benefits, as does adapting to newer models
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and innovation. The following chapters attempt to study the traditional and nontraditional ways of operating a baseball club. This includes the history, advantages, and
disadvantages of each, as well as an analysis of how to balance each department within
the larger baseball operations department.
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I. SCOUTING
History of Scouting
The art of scouting truly dates back to the beginning of baseball: any type of
tryout or recruitment activity required team delegates to physically evaluate players and
make distinctions between them in order to build rosters. However, scouting did not
become a more formalized activity until much later, specifically the mid 1900’s. The
Baseball Hall of Fame provides copies of scouting reports dating back to the 1950’s.
These reports and the decade as a whole serve as a starting point of reference that allows
for an exploration of the development of amateur scouting leading up to today.
1950s:
The 1950’s marks the earliest reports found via the Baseball Hall of Fame’s
database. These reports are fairly basic, yet they contain similar information to what is
used today. The bulk of the report is the five tools used to evaluate position players—
hitting, power, running, arm, and fielding. The tools for pitchers are also shown,
specifically velocity, control, changeup, curveball, poise, and stamina. Regarding
intangibles, the report template covered only three: attitude, habits, and hustle. Figure 1
is an example of a report for a pitcher, Bob Gibson. As shown, tools for both pitching and
hitting are included on a single template.
An interesting distinction is that reports from this decade contained word ratings
instead of numerical: scouts graded on a scale from poor to very good. There were not a

3

lot of more detailed descriptors within the write-ups either. Instead, the scout was asked
for the most basic report followed by a “yes” or “no” evaluation of whether the player
was a prospect (Rymer, 2013).
Figure 1: Bob Gibson Scouting Report

1960s:
The 1960’s was a time of ample change for baseball organizations, the biggest
change being the creation of the amateur, or first year player, draft in 1965. The concept
of a draft was not new, as football, hockey, and basketball already used this method;
however, this change still greatly altered how teams conducted their acquisitions. Up
until this point, clubs were able to sign whichever players they wanted whenever they
wanted on a first-come, first-served basis. This process led to inequity between teams, as
the teams with the most resources, whether that be personnel or money, had a large
competitive advantage over smaller teams. While the creation of the draft did level the
4

playing field for less competitive teams, the main purpose was actually to cut signing
bonuses. In 1964, major league teams paid over $7 million to amateur players. At the
time, this was a substantial amount of money and was more than what teams were paying
to players on their current rosters. The draft reduced these signing bonuses by giving the
players less power: instead of having the ability to negotiate with every team in the
league, the players now only had one option (Manuel, 2010). Ultimately, the addition of
the amateur draft made it necessary for teams to curate more in-depth scouting reports
(Rymer, 2013).
The 1960’s also marks the beginning of a more quantitative approach to
evaluating players. Teams added a “prospect rating box” in which the scout would mark a
“1” for definite major league prospect, “2” for good major league prospect, and “3” for
fair major league prospect. Towards the end of the decade, the numerical scale for tool
grades was established as well; instead of a scale from “poor” to “very good,” there is a
numerical scale from “1” to “5,” with “1” being the best. There are different boxes for
pitchers and position players, allowing scouts to only grade the necessary position for the
player. The final difference is the amount of detail within the description. Compared to
the 1950’s report, the written comments from the scout paint a much better picture of the
player (Rymer, 2013). Figure 2 shows a report on Chris Chambliss, who was given a
prospect rating of 2. All of his tools are graded on a scale from one to five, and the
comments are much more descriptive.
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Figure 2: Chris Chambliss Scouting Report

1970s:
Baseball continued to change drastically throughout the 1970’s. In 1974, Major
League Baseball created the Scouting Bureau. The Bureau was established in order to
provide centralized scouting information prior to each amateur draft (Rymer, 2013). In
addition, the organization created a uniform scouting report template which can be seen
in Figure 3, Kirk Gibson’s write-up from 1978.
Another major change from the Bureau was the addition of the 20-80 scale
(Rymer, 2013). The 20-80 scale was originally started by Branch Rickey. The scale was
designed with 50 as the average, or mean, for a player at the major league level. Each 10point jump away from 50 in either direction represented one standard deviation from that
mean (Lindbergh & Arthur, 2019). The scale goes from 20-80 instead of 0-100, because
three standard deviations (or in this case 30 points in either direction) would include
99.7% of the sample when that sample is normally distributed, as baseball players are
assumed to be (McDaniel, 2014). It differs from the previous one to five scale, as there is
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opportunity for more differentiation, and a higher rating is better than a lower one. This
scale can be seen in the reports; however, it was mostly used to grade tangible tools.
Another addition to scouting reports was an evaluation of signability. Typically,
this was accompanied by the expected signing bonus, as well as the recommended
signing bonus. Figure 3 shows a worth of $100,000 for Kirk Gibson. The tangible tools
were also broken down into distinct facets. The running grade was broken into speed and
base running; arm grade became strength and accuracy; range was added in addition to
fielding; and fastballs were broken into velocity and liveliness. The increased importance
of intangibles is another difference from previous decades. Reports now had a section for
additional make-up characteristics such as dedication, agility, aptitude, and physical and
emotional maturity (Rymer, 2013). The addition of an overall future potential calculation
can also be seen in Kirk Gibson’s report. Overall future potential is the combined score,
or grade, from a player’s tools. OFP is a simple average of the individual grades: when
evaluating position players on a 20-80 scale, the five tools are added together and divided
by five. For pitchers, the grades of their pitches are added together and divided by the
number of pitches.
Overall, reports from this decade show increasing amounts of information. Every
facet of a player is broken down into distinct categories and given numerical values and
detailed written descriptions. The business side of the draft is also addressed for the first
time with the addition of monetary worth.
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Figure 3: Kirk Gibson Scouting Report

1980s:
The 1980’s brought restructuring for the Scouting Bureau. In 1984, membership
in the Bureau became mandatory for scouts. The subsequent year, the Bureau was
reestablished under the Commissioner’s Office (Baseball Reference, 2019).
The scouting reports themselves remained virtually the same, although small
adjustments were made. Teams began describing the type of hitter and the type of power.
Figure 4 shows a report for Mark McGwire from 1984. There is a section dedicated to
distinguishing whether the player is a pull, straight away, or opposite field hitter,
McGwire being evaluated as a pull hitter. Additionally, teams started grading intangibles
numerically, although it was on a one to four scale instead of 20-80 (Rymer, 2013).
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Figure 4: Mark McGwire Scouting Report

1990s:
The reports from the 1990’s remain similar in format and content. One difference
is that teams began to conduct deeper dives into players’ lives, including more
background information in their reports. Figure 5 shows the Cincinnati Reds’ report on
Derek Jeter. The report goes as far as including the names and occupations of Jeter’s
parents and the name of his family physician. Intangibles are also evaluated on the 20-80
scale in Jeter’s report. In addition, reports from this decade are the first to include
adjusted overall future potential with the basic overall future potential grade. This
allowed scouts to adjust the formula based on their subjective opinion (Rymer, 2013).
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Figure 5: Derek Jeter Scouting Report
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Benefits of Scouting
Scouting has been a tradition throughout major league front offices dating back to
the beginning of the game. It has become an inherent part of baseball and has multiple
positive attributes causing this longevity.
Firstly, there are some dimensions of a player that simply cannot be evaluated
with analytics, no matter how far teams can advance technologically. For example,
intangibles such as work ethic, instincts, and aggressiveness are difficult to measure via
data. While they are also hard for a scout to see, superior scouts have the ability to meet
with coaches, the player, and their families in order to get a more well-rounded picture of
their mentality.
Another interesting facet of scouting is the ability to differentiate between players
who may have very similar stat lines or metrics. When getting the same analytical output
for two or more players, it may be difficult for a team to value one higher than another.
This is where scouts can enter the conversation to provide insight on the intangibles or
certain mechanics (Lindbergh & Arthur, 2019).
The key advantage of scouting comes when evaluating amateur players. Scouts
are necessary in these instances for two main reasons, the first being the lack of
technology available at the amateur level. While technologies such as Trackman and
Synergy are commonly available at the professional and collegiate levels, it is highly
unlikely that they would be present at high school fields or in the international market
(Springer, 2018).
Secondly, amateur players require a higher level of prediction. The A’s General
Manager David Forst stated that, “the further away from the big leagues, the more I need
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subjective information” (Apstein, 2019). With a younger player, it is imperative to look at
what they have the potential to become, focusing on prediction, instead of what they are
at the moment, focusing on statistics. Because of this, there is a large emphasis on not
only the intangibles, but also current mechanics and body projections. These predictions
are more important than statistics, as competition at the amateur level may or may not be
sufficient, rendering a player’s stat line unindicative. Body projections are also necessary,
since players of the same age may not be at the same level of physical maturity. Scouts
have to physically see the player in order to evaluate how much they are expected to
grow and develop, as the player’s physicality could greatly alter their playing ability.
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Drawbacks of Scouting
While scouts can give valuable information, there are a lot of reasons why a scout
might miss, mostly due to the subjective nature of the business.
Ben Lindbergh (2019) identified four main reasons why a scout may not predict
future performance correctly. The first is that certain players may have a deeper longing
to get better or stronger work ethic. Lindbergh’s example was Travis Hafner, a player
who received ten “do not acquire” ratings out of eleven reports. While Hafner was not
expected to make it in the game, he consistently worked to improve through watching
video, working out, and adjusting his mechanics. This level of dedication was something
that the majority of scouts overlooked due to current performance.
Lindbergh’s second point was the difficulty in quantifying a skill set. This issue is
the inherent problem with evaluating based solely on watching the player: scouting is
more of an art, while analytics is the science. Because of this, players are incredibly
difficult to quantify, especially when it comes to intangibles. Lindbergh presented David
Ross, a catcher with seven “do not acquire” ratings out of eight, as his example. As a
catcher, Ross’s niche was his ability to interact with his pitchers and the energy he
brought to a clubhouse. These are qualities that a scout may not see from the stands, and
there is no box on a scouting report for them. In addition, the game changed greatly over
Ross’s fifteen seasons in the Major Leagues. By the end of Ross’s tenure, the value of a
catcher had increased greatly. Specifically, the importance of framing, something Ross
was above average at, was emphasized. Because scouts have a frame of reference of the
game as it currently operates, they were unable to value this strength of his at time of
evaluation.
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Another issue for scouts is the misconceptions surrounding especially athletic or
unathletic looking bodies. Lindbergh’s example here was Ben Davis, a player who was
described by scouts as having “God’s body” and received zero “do not acquire” ratings in
eighteen reports. Davis was expected to be above average behind the plate with some
power in the bat; however, his hitting ability never worked at the Major League level. His
strength quickly eroded as well: Davis claimed that he “fizzled out”. The opposite here
can also be true: players who are seen as having a “bad body” can be deceptively quick
and agile, playing better than expected upon first glance. It is much simpler for biases
like these to slip into scouting reports, as it is a subjective process.
The final problem that Lindbergh addressed was actually not a scouting issue at
all. Instead, he states that the reason a player may not live up to his expected potential
could be attributed to poor player development. Jeff Schmidt was the poster child for this
issue. Schmidt received only three “do not acquire” ratings from his seventeen
evaluations. His biggest downfall was his lack of secondary pitches; however, scouts
seemed to look past it, because they believed that he had the raw ability and could be
taught the rest of the necessities to perform at the professional level. The player
development department failed to properly help Schmidt in doing this, causing him to
never turn into the pitcher that he was expected to be.
In addition to Lindbergh’s reasonings, the foundation upon which the art of
scouting is based, the 20-80 scale, is also flawed. The 20-80 scale assumes normal
distribution, meaning that there should be a certain percentage of players in each 10-point
range: the majority of players should be around average, or 50, with fewer at the
extremities, 20 or 80. However, it was noted that scouts are typically not using the full
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range of the scale. Jeff Luhnow, former General Manager for the Houston Astros and
front office executive for the St. Louis Cardinals, realized that most scouts are sitting in
the 45 to 55 range. Some scouts, such as Dayton Moore, claim that they have never put
an 80 grade on a player (Kepner, 2017). The problem here is that it will quickly become
difficult to differentiate players if everyone is receiving similar grades. While the highest
number of rankings should fall between 45 and 55, it is imperative that there are higher
and lower overall future potential grades in order to show preference and difference in
skill between players.
This phenomenon could be occurring because scouts are afraid to “miss” on a
player. Giving OFP grades of a 45 to 55 is safe: if you expect a player to be average, any
performance above or below that standard seems like a minor miscalculation. However,
predicting a player to be a 70 or 80, meaning a high impact performer, is incredibly risky:
even if he becomes an average major league player, he still falls short of the high
expectations that were set for him. This can also be risky financially, as a player with
higher projections will be given a higher signing bonus. No scout likes to be wrong,
especially when their job is dependent on the success of the players from their area. The
use of the extremities needs to be encouraged within the scouting community in order to
offset this inequity.
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II. ANALYTICS
“I think in this business today, to be smart about it, you better understand that this
is where the game is trending, and I don’t see how it’s going to stop. Because when you
look at analytics ... you understand that these are verifiable numbers, that these are
absolutes for what the player has done.”
- Carl Moesche
History of Data in Baseball
1950s:
Similar to scouting, the history of analytics can also be traced back to the 1950’s,
when the first more advanced statistic, on-base percentage, was invented by Allan Roth
and Branch Rickey, the founder of the 20-80 scale (Major League Baseball, 2019). At
this time, statisticians and key baseball executives were slowly beginning to dabble into
the mathematical side of baseball; however, these discoveries were not widely accepted.
1970s:
The 1970’s initiated a seismic shift in baseball regarding statistics. The most
influential person behind this movement was an outsider with little baseball background:
Bill James. James studied baseball through encyclopedias and box scores. He made many
discoveries regarding controversial issues and decided to publish his findings in a book in
1977. This book slowly gained success and a following, and Bill James decided to
publish the Baseball Abstract annually. He coined his discoveries as “sabermetrics,”
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coming from the acronym for the Society for American Baseball Research. He describes
sabermetrics as “the search for objective knowledge about baseball,” and this term is still
used today (McGrath, 2003).
2000s:
Up until the early 2000s, analytics were simply used to describe things that had
already happened. In 2003, however, data began being used to predict future
performance. At this point, clubs were using very rudimentary information and did not
have designated personnel: only four or five clubs had staff members in their front offices
whose jobs were solely analytics related. In addition, all of the teams’ data was stored
externally (De Smet, 2018).
2003 also marked the year that the best-seller Moneyball was published.
Moneyball quickly exposed the public to the inner-workings of an analytics-oriented
baseball club. According to Jeff Passan (2018), “the genius of Moneyball was Lewis’
ability to take something as opaque as numbers and make them entirely relatable”.
Everyone, from casual fans to Ivy League graduates, understood the philosophy of the
Oakland Athletics under Billy Beane’s leadership. Moneyball increased the acceptance of
analytics in the front office: the debate of whether or not analytics should even be used
fell to the wayside (Futterman, 2011). Now, it was a matter of using data and statistics in
a new and innovative way.
In addition to the acceptance of the analytics craze, a lack of transparency quickly
fell over baseball. After the A’s strategies were exposed in the book, the Boston Red Sox
and New York Yankees quickly replicated them; however, they paired these strategies
with a much higher budget, often finding themselves more successful than their
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predecessor. Teams became secretive in an attempt to hold onto the competitive
advantage that they created through differentiation (Futterman, 2011).
Today:
Now, basically everything is tracked through analytics, whether it be ball
trajectory or the physics of a bat swing or pitcher’s delivery. Every general manager now
has a background or interest in analytics. The size of front offices has also grown greatly:
now most teams have at least twelve to fifteen people with advanced experience in
analytics to mine data and create models. The secrecy issue has also led to changes: all
data has moved in-house in order to ensure that information is not shared with other
teams (De Smet 2018).
Some of the effects of Moneyball can be seen today. The novel emphasized the
importance of the three “true outcomes”: homeruns, strikeouts, and walks. In 2002,
before publication, 28.24% of plays ended in one of the three true outcomes. In 2018, this
number had increased to 34.26% (Passan, 2018). It is unclear whether this is causal, but it
could be due to the metrics that front office executives shifted their attention to.
Regardless, baseball has entered a new era—the era of data.
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Benefits of Analytics
Just as scouting as an art has its advantages, the science of analytics also has
undeniable benefits. It is because of these benefits that analytics has swept over the
baseball world at such a rapid pace and continues to be implemented at all levels.
The main advantage of the analytics revolution is the fact that data is verifiable
and objective: while the use of those statistics may be debated, no one can argue with the
numbers themselves. The data is factual and has a sound basis, whereas scouting is a
subjective measure. Bret Levine (2015) stated that, “analytics makes sense because most
of it is overtly visible—above the surface”.
In addition, analytics allows teams to do something different. With scouting,
every organization is doing the same thing: sending scouts out to watch players, writing
them up, and evaluating them on the same 20-80 scale that has been used for years. While
certain scouts may see something in a player that a different scout does not see, their
processes are going to be more or less identical. In the analytical world, every team could
value a different statistic or measure. The model used by each team is going to vary,
assigning new weights to each variable, thus resulting in different outputs.
The beauty of this differentiation between models is that one team may be
interested in different players than a team using another model. The Astros found this to
be the case with three players, Alex Bregman, Carlos Correa, and Dallas Keuchel, and
saw positive outcomes from their use of data.
The Astros took Alex Bregman with the second overall pick in the 2015 draft.
While teams were aware of Bregman’s abilities, he was not universally considered to be
one of the top picks of that draft class. The Astros, behind Jeff Luhnow and their
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analytically savvy front office, had Bregman as their most logical pick. Bregman has
been a big contributor to the Astros’ success since making his debut in 2016,
participating in multiple Home Run Derbies and All-Star Games and earning a Silver
Slugger award (De Smet, 2018).
A similar phenomenon occurred with Carlos Correa. Correa was valued to go
somewhere near the middle of the first round in 2012. However, he was selected first
overall pick, because the Astros’ analytical model valued him that heavily. Correa went
on to win Rookie of the Year and continues to impact the team positively (De Smet,
2018).
Dallas Keuchel’s situation was a little different. At the time of the draft, Keuchel
was not valued nearly as much as Bregman and Correa: he was taken by the Astros in the
seventh round in 2009. Luhnow, however, claimed that he would be on the Major League
roster by 2014 despite his place in the draft. Keuchel broke into the big leagues in 2012
and went on to win the Cy Young award for the American League in 2015 (De Smet,
2018).
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Drawbacks of Analytics
The negative aspects of analytics correlate strongly to the positive aspects of
scouting. Firstly, access in the high school and international markets can be tough. The
technology needed for certain metrics is very rare at these levels, making it necessary for
teams to rely on other measures.
Analytics can lead teams to certain unexpected players, but it can also cause
teams to skip over guys with good potential. One major issue is the size of scouting
departments compared to analytics departments. The numbers show that most teams have
actually increased their number of scouts, or at least kept it the same from what it was ten
years ago. However, a few teams such as the Astros and Mariners have decreased the size
of their scouting department since 2009 (Lindbergh, 2019).
Scouting inherently requires a lot of people: between amateur scouting throughout
the United States, international scouting, and pro scouting, large scouting departments are
necessary to successfully cover every area at every level. Increasing analytics can
potentially lead to smaller scouting departments, especially when budgets are limited.
Smaller scouting departments can then lead to missing players due to the size of the areas
that scouts are then required to cover (Longenhagen, 2018). While this will probably not
affect the first few rounds of the draft, it could lead to gaps in the later rounds. If teams
with smaller scouting departments are only focusing on the bigger, more well-known
players, they may not have the time to deeply evaluate players who could go later in the
draft. Those players are less risky, as their signing bonuses are lower; however, they can
still be impactful players to have in the farm system.
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The Astros, for example, have completely gotten rid of their pro scouting
department. Not only do they have a very limited number of scouts evaluating all of the
amateur players in the United States, they also lack eyes on the players within their own
farm system (Lindbergh, 2019).
Continuing with the Astros, as they are typically regarded as baseball’s most
analytically inclined team, there are two main examples of where analytics failed. One
mistake, JD Martinez, was not an acquisition mistake, but a retention one. When
Martinez first came up for the Astros, he was not producing the way that they expected
him to. Martinez continued to work, adjusting the mechanics of his swing between the
2013 and 2014 seasons in hopes of receiving more playing time. However, the team did
not give him an opportunity to prove himself, as they valued the objective numbers more
than the subjective evaluation of the changes that the player had made. They decided to
release Martinez, who then went on to have All-Star seasons with the Detroit Tigers and
Boston Red Sox (De Smet, 2018).
An acquisition mistake of the Astros’ was in 2013 with first overall pick Mark
Appel. Appel is consistently cited as an analytics-driven draft pick and is only the third
number one pick to never see the Major Leagues (Morris, 2019).
When asked about these blunders, Luhnow stated that, “you have to realize we’re
playing probabilities. There are going to be some losses along the way. There are going
to be some decisions that don’t work out. And you have to continue to emphasize that
we’re playing a long game here” (2018).
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III. BALANCING THE FRONT OFFICE DEPARTMENTS
“If you challenge conventional wisdom, you will find ways to do things much
better than they are currently done.”
- Bill James
One of the biggest controversies for baseball fans and front offices alike is how to
balance the use of evaluations from scouts with the information derived from analytics. It
is extremely difficult to decide whether a team should focus heavily on one extreme or
use a combination. When combining the two, it comes down to the how. How do teams
decide which department to put more emphasis on? How do they create a formula or
process for combining the two sides? How do they staff their front office so that the
different departments can intermingle?
At a general level, there is not a single answer that will fit universally for every
team: what works for a team like the New York Yankees may not work for a team like
the Arizona Diamondbacks. Because of this, each team must create their own strategy.
Overall, however, teams must base their decision off of two main things to create a
competitive advantage: their resources and their competencies.
Resources
When it comes to resources, there are three that are the most relevant: budget,
people, and market.
Budget, as is true for any industry, is the most vital to consider. The more money
available to a team, the more people that they can staff, tying in the second resource of
people. It may be easier for high budget teams to fully staff both their analytics
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department and their scouting department, with designated people in the middle to serve
as conduits. An example of a team that has this ability is the New York Yankees. The
Yankees, who consistently have one of the highest payrolls in baseball, show an affinity
for the analytics side with Vice President and Assistant General Manager Michael
Fishman serving under General Manager Brian Cashman: Fishman originally served as
their Analytics Director before moving into the assistant general manager role in 2005
(Baumer, 2015). The Yankees also, however, boast an 80-man scouting department, the
largest in baseball (Lindbergh, 2019).
On the other end of the spectrum, the Oakland Athletics typically have one of the
lowest payrolls in baseball. The Athletics strategy was clearly exposed in the novel
Moneyball: due to the extremely low budget of the early 2000’s Athletics, General
Manager Billy Beane was not able to hang onto his star players for very long. He quickly
realized that he would need to use analytics to identify players that had been counted out
of the game due to injuries or unconventional attributes (Lewis, 2003). Today, the A’s
still have a moderately sized scouting department with 51 staff members (Lindbergh,
2019). However, they are aware that their lack of money forces them to sign less
conventional players, thus requiring their dependency on analytics.
Market, on the other hand, has more of a domino effect. Firstly, the size of the
market is going to affect the budget. The previous examples, the Yankees and Athletics,
show this phenomenon perfectly: in a 2012 article, the Yankees were ranked number 1
for largest market, whereas the Athletics came in at number 29 (Trueblood, 2012). A
2011 study also explored the effects of market size on payroll in Major League Baseball.
This study provided an R^2 of 0.45 as shown in figure 6 (Gaines, 2011).
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Figure 6: Market Size’s Effect on Payroll

In addition, market has effects on signability. These effects are something that can
be seen time and time again throughout Major League Baseball, specifically regarding
free agency. Players have their own motives when choosing a team, typically revolving
around their desire to win. Because of this, many players may value the reputation of a
team more than the money that they are offering, taking a lower salary from a “better”
team than a higher one from a lesser team. The Chicago White Sox have consistently
gotten caught up in the middle of this recently, losing out on many free agents even when
offering large salaries. The White Sox have been increasingly competitive over the past
few off-seasons, attempting to sign players like Manny Machado. However, the more
impressive free agents typically sign elsewhere due to the lack of success of the White
Sox in recent years. In addition, location can be a large factor when deciding a team.
Players may be inclined to sign when relocating to cities that are more interesting, or
cities that they are tied to. Madison Bumgarner, for example, decided to sign with
Arizona in the offseason prior to 2020 due to the location of his ranch (Jomboy Media,
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2019). Like budget, these occurrences may cause teams to use other tactics to identify
less popular free agents who will still benefit the team.
Competencies
The three main resources lead to the most important factor in finding balance:
core competency. To be specific, teams must evaluate the core competency of their
General Manager. As the leader of the front office, it is important to build the
departments based off of the GM’s expertise, whether that be analytics, scouting, or a
combination of the two.
Three examples can be used to demonstrate this point: the Houston Astros, the St.
Louis Cardinals, and the San Diego Padres.
As previously discussed, the Houston Astros were known to be leading the
industry in the analytics sector under former General Manager Jeff Luhnow. Luhnow has
a fairly diverse background, but his expertise is on the analytics side. He graduated with a
degree in economics and began his career in baseball with the St. Louis Cardinals. With
the Cardinals, Luhnow worked in baseball development, player procurement, scouting,
and player development, bringing an analytical mindset to each of these departments.
Data and modeling are Luhnow’s specialties, so it makes sense that the Astros were
operating with that capacity in mind: the rest of the front office needed to mirror his
approach, as he needed their inputs to ultimately make his analytically centered decisions.
One team that focuses mostly on a balance between scouting and analytics is the
St. Louis Cardinals. The team operates under two main executives: President of Baseball
Operations John Mozeliak and General Manager Mike Girsch. The Cardinals have found
this balance, as Mozeliak’s experience is in scouting, while Girsch focuses on analytics.
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Mozeliak has been with the Cardinals for twenty-one years and has worked
primarily in the scouting department. He served as Scouting Director before climbing up
the ladder to General Manager. As the Cardinals’ front office grew, he transitioned into
the role of President of Baseball Operations, overseeing all of the micro-departments
within the umbrella (St. Louis Cardinals).
Girsch, on the other hand, has a math background and made his way into the front
office through the draft model that he created. He was the inaugural face of the Baseball
Development endeavor, the Cardinals’ version of an analytics department. He was then
promoted to Assistant GM under Mozeliak, before they were both promoted into their
current roles (St. Louis Cardinals).
The Cardinals utilize the competencies of their leadership by operating through a
formula, combining the scouting grades for a player with their analytical score. This
method gives them a single value that allows them to compare players with ease. Because
they have two leaders that have specialized knowledge of both sides, the office is able to
operate at the middle-ground.
On the other extreme is the San Diego Padres. The Padres act under General
Manager A.J. Preller. Before joining the Padres, Preller worked for the Texas Rangers.
He was known with the Rangers for his efforts in building the farm system, specifically
through amateur and international scouting. His final role with the Rangers before
becoming general manager of the Padres was Senior Director of Player Personnel (San
Diego Padres).
With the Padres, Preller emphasizes the importance of the farm system heavily,
similarly to his priorities with the Rangers. He staffs a fairly large scouting department,
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with 60 staff members in 2019 (Lindbergh, 2019). The stress that Preller has put on
amateur and international scouting has led the Padres to consistently have one of the top
farm systems in Major League Baseball, ranking number 1 in 2019 (MLB.com, 2019).
Without the leadership and experience of Preller, the Padres may not have been able to
make these strides with their prospects and farm system.
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IV. SCOUTING IN PRACTICE
In conducting this research and coming to the conclusion that teams need to work
off of the core competency of their General Manager, I decided to take the time to reflect
upon how a team would operate under my leadership.
My background is primarily scouting-based. While I understand much of the
analytical side, I prefer to evaluate in person rather than create models based off of
statistics or measures. This preference is primarily due to my deep passion for the game
at its core: scouting is a tradition and holds true to the inherent nature of baseball, even
with the deviation of analytics.
In addition, I have formal training in the art of scouting through my experience
with the Wareham Gatemen, a team in the Cape Cod Baseball League. Because of this, a
team under my guidance as general manager would be inclined to place more value on
the scouting side and work on building a solid farm system based off of evaluations from
scouts.
While with the Gatemen, I took on the task of scouting the entire Cape Cod
Baseball League. I traveled to see all ten teams in the league and wrote up full scouting
reports on the fifty best players that I saw. In the end, I took their overall future potential
and adjusted overall future potential grades to rank the fifty players into an ordered list.
This list can be found in Appendix A. Also included in the appendix are full reports on
the top five players—Spencer Torkelson (Arizona State University, Chatham Anglers),
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Jud Fabian (University of Florida, Bourne Braves), Carmen Mlodzinski (University of
South Carolina, Falmouth Commodores), Trey Dillard (University of Missouri, Wareham
Gatemen), and Jordan Westburg (Mississippi State University, Hyannis Harbor Hawks).
If I were a General Manager, this is the list that I would work off of, assuming
that money was not a variable. The Cape League is only a small portion of draft eligible
and future draft eligible players; however, it is consistently ranked as the top collegiate
summer baseball league, producing first round draft picks every year. This system could
also be applied on a larger, more national scale with multiple scouts contributing instead
of just myself.
This method of evaluation is superior to an analytical approach in regard to the
draft due to the level of projection that is necessary for amateur players. In 2018, the
average age of a Major League Baseball player was twenty-nine years old (USA Today,
2018). Drafted players fall into three categories: high school players, college players who
are at least twenty-one years of age, and junior college players (Major League Baseball,
2020). This requirement means that the vast majority of draftees are between seventeen
and twenty-three years old, necessitating baseball organizations to predict what a player
will be multiple years in the future. While statistics can be used to project, there are a
multitude of intangibles that give valuable information about a player that simply cannot
be shown with statistics. Because of this, it is wise for organizations to continue to place
emphasis on the scouting side of baseball operations, specifically when evaluating and
ranking players for the amateur draft.
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V. CONCLUSION
While conducting this research, I realized that no team works solely in one
capacity. Even teams like the Astros that are regarded as being exclusively data-driven
have departments that handle the scouting side. The size of front offices in general has
grown incredibly over the past few decades and will continue with this trend as long as
baseball remains profitable. Because of this, every front office has at least a few members
of each department, regardless of which the organization values the most.
Having both departments is imperative to organizations, as it gives a well-rounded
perspective on the players that they are evaluating. Every team is striving to create a
competitive edge within their baseball operations department, necessitating front offices
to look at athletes from every angle.
In addition, the stage of the player development process is imperative in deciding
the method. This research focused solely on the acquisition of amateur players through
the draft; however, different approaches may be considered for the training of players in
the minor and major leagues, as well as acquisitions through other methods such as trades
and free agent signings.
Baseball operations will continue to grow and adapt as technology does.
However, the traditional processes have proven successful for many years and should not
be disregarded even with the addition of new methods.
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